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Among EU governments and political parties, there is a rising tendency to 
claim that intra-EU migration puts a serious strain on the sustainability of 
welfare provision. Several countries are enforcing measures aimed at 
limiting the access of other EU citizens to unemployment schemes, health 
care assistance, etc., and also calling on the EU to tighten rules to end 
"benefit tourism". However, Commission reports have shown how minimal 
the impact of "benefit tourism" is on welfare scheme budgets. Does this 
political attitude, which exposes the growing concerns of the traditional 
parties about the competition of right wing populism, risk adding further 
barriers to labour mobility and to the portability of rights, especially in a 
time of widening gaps in employment differentials? How much of the 
welfare financing difficulties do the intra-EU flows account for? Does this 
identitarian rhetoric add up to a race to the bottom in social provisions? 
Should a European response, in defence of the single market, aim to 
establish a level playing field rather than accommodating social 
competition? 
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Jackie Morin began by giving a factual outline of 
the free movement of citizens within the EU. You 
can move to work as an employee in another 
state, known as the free movement of workers, 
which is set down in Article 45 of the Treaty.  
You can move to establish a company in another 
Member State and work as self employed, 
established in Article 49. Or you can move as a 
posted worker if your company wins a contract for 
a service in another state, set down in Article 56. 
These three situations are different in terms of 
legal statutes and have different implications so 
Jackie Morin focused on the free movement of 
workers as this is most relevant to the debate at 
hand. EU citizens can also move to live or reside 
in a different state, e.g., to get a pension or 
because they consider it a nice place to live. This 
is covered by Article 21.  
The free movement 
of workers was 
introduced from the 
beginning of the 
union, with 
transitional measures 
at first. It was 
implemented in 1968 
by EU six and now 
covers 27 member 
states. A transitional 
period of seven years 
is in place for Croatia; therefore Croatian workers 
do not enjoy free movement in 13 countries. There 
is also free movement between the EU and 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, with some 
quotas for Liechtenstein. Furthermore, the EU has 
an agreement on free movement with Switzerland 
which was subject to a referendum recently. 
Regarding the free movement for citizens, any EU 
citizen can go to another member state for a 
period of three months without any conditions 
or formalities. If they wish to stay longer, there 
are no conditions for workers. However for non 
active citizens the right to reside may be subject to 
having sufficient resources. Member States can set 
a test to ensure that non actives staying longer 
than three months have sufficient resources and 
will not become a burden to the state.  After 5 
years an EU citizen is entitled to permanent 
residency which is covered by Directive 2004/38 
and Article 21 of the Treaty.  
If we look at how these rights are applied in 
practice, we see that today 3% of EU citizens 
reside in another Member State. There all also 
1.2 million cross border workers who work in one 
Member State and reside in another. First of all, 
this figure has greatly increased over the last 
decade: from 1.6% in 2004 to around 3% today. 
This quite significant increase is linked to 
enlargement; three quarters of the increase is 
accounted for by the EU10 and EU2 
enlargements. Secondly, 3% is less than the 
percentage of Third Country nationals within 
the EU, which stands at 4%. Third country 
nationals are subject to work permit schemes yet 
despite this limitation there are a larger number of 
them in the EU than EU citizens living in other 
Member States.  
An interesting statistic is that when EU citizens 
are asked if they are interested in moving to 
another Member State, 20% say they are 
interested, 1.2% say they have a firm intention to 
move within a year and 0.2% actually move. 
Therefore, the ratio between expectation and 
realisation is 1:100; out of 100 who are interested, 
only one will move in the end. Jackie Morin 
presented a graph comparing the mobility rate of 
the USA which stands at 2.4% per year and the 
mobility rate of the EU which is 0.2%. This is a 








huge difference, and of course the context is 
different, but data seem to indicate that 
problems lie more with obstacles than with too 
much mobility.  
If we look at where EU migrants have been going 
over the last ten years we see the usual candidates: 
Luxembourg, Ireland, Cyprus and Belgium. It 
should be noted, however, that the most 
significant receiving countries are the four big 
countries of Spain, Italy, UK and Germany, and 
for most EU countries the percentage of intra-EU 
migrants is below 2%. Looking at migrants’ 
countries of origin over the last ten years an 
income effect can be seen. We see migration from 
Romania and Bulgaria which is clearly driven by a 
search for better working and living conditions 
elsewhere. The more economically successful 
Eastern countries have less emigration than their 
neighbours. Over the last few years there has been 
much debate about the perception of mobility; 
mostly in the UK press but also elsewhere, and 
responses in the Romanian press, for example. So 
there has been growing discussion about the 
intentions of EU migrants and the 
consequences of intra-EU migration and this 
discussion has polarised East and West within 
the EU.  
Jackie Morin next presented information about 
conditions for access to social assistance and 
related figures. On social assistance, which is 
linked to poverty, Directive 2004/38 is quite clear: 
there is no obligation to provide social assistance 
to non active migrants during their first 3 months 
of residence and after this time there is equal 
treatment in terms of provision, except in the case 
of unreasonable burden where the state can decide 
to end the right of residence. Social security is 
covered by social security regulation; however the 
different social security systems in Europe fall 
under national competencies so social security 
cooperation only links these systems. The main 
question in regards to the regulation of social 
security is, which country should pay social 
security if a citizen moves to another state? To 
make it simple, the new country that takes care of 
social security for the worker from day one, and at 
the same time the worker contributes to social 
security and taxes in the country. For non active 
migrants the country of residence is responsible 
for social security but only after the non active 
migrant has passed a habitual residence test. In 
other words, the person needs to demonstrate that 
he or she no longer has any links with the previous 
country and has completely moved to the new 
country. 
So is social security a pull factor for workers? 
When workers are asked, the answer is no. 
They say they move to find a job, for better career 
opportunities and to get a better salary, according 
to a 2013 Eurobarometer survey. There was a 
huge decrease between 2008 and 2012 in 
immigration to Spain, Ireland and Italy, and an 
increase to Germany, which appears to show that 
jobs are what attract people to move. If we look at 
the impact of the economic crisis we see that 
mobility decreased in the period between 2008 
and 2011, demonstrating that migration is 
linked to job opportunities. If migration was 
linked to benefits then we should have seen an 
increase in mobility in this period.  
If the problem is not workers, is it therefore the 
movement of non active persons attracted by 
social security systems? First of all, EU migrants 
are more active than nationals, with an activity 
rate of 78%, compared to a rate of 72% for 
nationals, and EU migrant employment rates are 
much higher. Non active migrants represent only 
between 0.7% and 1% of the total EU population. 








The vast majority, 80%, of non actives are 
relatives of active persons, meaning that they 
depend on workers and not the national system of 
the host state. Therefore, only 20% of the 0.7% of 
non active persons are purely dependant on their 
own resources or the local system. In order to 
ascertain if EU migrants are greater beneficiaries 
of social security systems than nationals, Jackie 
Morin referred to a UK study from the 
Department for Work and Pensions in 2013 which 
shows that EU mobile citizens claim 2% of 
benefits while comprising 4.6% of the working 
population.  
In order to investigate whether the negative 
perception of intra-EU migration is based on the 
possibility of fraud, two monitoring tools, an 
administration group which deals with free 
movement and an administration group which 
deals with social security, were asked to search for 
cases of fraud, abuse and errors, both in terms of 
right to residence (for example sham marriages) 
and in terms of social security fraud. In both cases 
they were unable to find any substantial reports of 
fraud by EU migrants from the Member States 
themselves, only anecdotal evidence. 
Is this negative perception based on economic 
cost? We see that in fact mobility has a positive 
impact on receiving countries. In macroeconomic 
terms, the GDP of EU 15 has increased by 1% 
since the last enlargement there is no evidence 
relating specific costs to mobility. An issue raised 
in this debate, which has been introduced into 
recent discussions the mayors of large cities, is 
that we need to focus more on integration and 
on the impact of mobility, not only in terms of 
citizens’ rights, but also the impact on receiving 
countries in terms of ensuring good integration. 
The social fund is a powerful tool here because 
20% of it can be dedicated to social cohesion such 
as integration schemes like language training for 
migrants.  
The debate will decide whether we should be 
concerned or not, but what is a worry is the gap 
between perceptions and the facts; particularly in 
light of David Cameron’s recent comments, and 
the referendum in Switzerland. It is clear that 
perceptions have an impact and may put freedom 
of movement at risk. However, on a more positive 
note, when asked what they considered to be 
the EU’s greatest achievement, 56% of citizens 
said free movement.  Another positive aspect is 
that this debate has drawn attention to the question 
of integration and the capacity of Member States 
to integrate migrants well.  
Yves Pascouau took the floor by answering his 
co-speakers question and stating that, yes, we 
should be concerned. If we look at current trends 
and tendencies we must ask ourselves whether 
some day in the future we will have a single 
market without free movement. This seems to be 
the will of some national politicians and some EU 
citizens. If we look at the freedom of movement of 
workers and EU citizens over time, it is clear that 
freedom of movement has always been subject to 
criticism. However, up until recently, attacks 
against freedom of movement were limited to case 
law of the Court of 
Justice of the 
European Union and 
specific issues 
resulting from 
jurisprudence of the 
court. What we see 
over the last five 
years is that attacks 
are becoming more 
systematic and going 
beyond the limited 








cycle of EU specialists and the issue of limiting or 
restricting freedom of movement has spread to the 
national levels, the media in Member States and to 
EU citizens. Today there are highly educated 
people who ten years ago did not think for one 
minute that freedom of movement should be 
restricted who are now starting to agree with the 
British position.  
So the discourse about restricting freedom of 
movement has spread to a wider audience and 
the freedom of movement of EU citizens is now 
increasingly perceived in negative terms. The 
expulsion of EU citizens of Roma ethnicity from 
France in 2010 exemplifies how some EU citizens 
are being viewed as threats. The issue was raised 
in the Netherlands as well in 2011 when the 
expulsion of unemployed Polish citizens was 
proposed. Yves Pascouau commented that the 
perception of some EU citizens as a threat is 
spreading to the extent that today they are 
portrayed in the press, particularly the UK press, 
as cheaters, abusers and ‘benefit scroungers’. EU 
citizens moving from one country to another 
are being referred to as ‘migrants’, no longer 
as EU citizens, and this leads to them being 
treated as migrants; expulsion, reduced rights, etc. 
All of these factors together lead to a situation 
where the positive image of an EU citizen has 
changed to a negative one. 
What is even more striking today is that, as 
exemplified by the first speaker, there is no 
evidence that EU citizens exercising their right 
of freedom of movement are a burden to our 
social system. On the contrary, they are work-
related movers. What is extraordinary is that at 
least three EU Commissioners, Lázló Onder, 
Viviane Reding and to a certain extent Cecilia  
Malström are continually providing evidence that 
freedom of movement is not a question of abuse 
and is in fact positive. Despite the efforts of the 
Commissioners and their staff, and a significant 
body of studies and research, the recurrent 
negative picture emerges again and again.  
It could be said this is an overly gloomy portrayal; 
pressure on the freedom of movement has reduced 
since 1 January 2014 and the UK may be toning 
down their statements. However, if we look to 
Switzerland we see that caution is still needed. Of 
course, Swiss situation is not the same, but in 
Yves Pascouau’s estimation, the case has sounded 
two important warnings for the EU. First of all, if 
a similar referendum were held in any EU 
Member State, the results might be the same as in 
Switzerland. Secondly, if we consider the 
breakdown of voting in Switzerland, those who 
voted for the restriction of freedom of movement 
are, in general, residents of the countryside and 
agricultural areas of Switzerland, who are not 
directly confronted with the effects of migration. 
The majority of those who voted to maintain the 
existing freedom of movement were urban 
residents, which shows a clear division between 
these two groups in Swiss society. 
If we compare this situation with the EU, we see 
that there is a similar division between movers and 
non movers. 2.8% of the EU population resides in 
another state, and if we add those who left their 
home country and returned, the figure reaches 
almost 10%.  Yves Pascouau pointed out that the 
audience members present comprise part of this 
group who have moved to another country and are 
aware of the merits of freedom of movement. 
However, on the other side there are those that 
have not taken advantage of freedom of movement 
and therefore, do not understand its purpose. Who 
is responsible for telling people that freedom of 
movement is an asset?  The Commissioners are 
doing so. Those working in the ‘EU bubble’ are 








convinced of the merits while citizens of their 
home countries are more dubious. Are national 
politicians doing their job? Are they the link 
between what is achieved and proposed at an EU 
level, and what is implemented? 
Returning to the example of Switzerland, Yves 
Pascouau was struck by the fact that the day after 
the vote, former French Prime Minister Francois 
Fillon commented that the Swiss response was 
perfectly normal and that freedom of movement 
should be restricted. The EU Commissioners can 
keep speaking out in favour of freedom of 
movement but while a significant group of 
national politicians are against it, their words will 
fall on deaf ears. Citizens are more familiar with 
their national politicians than EU Commissioners 
so they will take what national politicians say 
more to heart. We need to ensure that support is 
not just voiced in the EU institutions; 
politicians need to defend this principle which 
forms the basis of what the EU stands for and 
where it aims to go. Over the last fifty years, 
freedom of movement has stood for the pursuit of 
ever more freedom and it needs to be protected. If 
we agree to row back on it, we are agreeing to 
limit our freedom.  
Given what can be seen in the media, Yves 
Pascouau asserted that he does not believe 
national politicians are doing their job with 
regards this issue. In conclusion, we should be 
concerned and, although pressure has been 
alleviated recently, there is still a risk that some 
Member States will continue to repeatedly 
attack freedom of movement until one day a 
coalition of states will form with enough pressure 
to force the Commission to present proposals to 





Jackie Morin disagreed with the assertion that 
Brussels does not listen. In the debate it seems that 
many people attack free movement as a way of 
attacking the EU itself. Regarding the letter from 
four national ministers, it was sent to three 
Commissioners and the President last April and 
raised the issues of fraud, integration, cost and 
social security. After this a series of debates were 
held and meetings on a technical level, and a 
council of ministers of the interior and the 
employment council discussed the issues. In the 
councils there was much more agreement than can 
be found in the letter and the media in general and 
the formal response was seen as satisfactory. As 
regards free movement, it must be kept in mind 
that at the founding of the EU, at least 4 out of the 
6 original members were against including 
freedom of movement of workers as one of the 
four freedoms so it has not been universally 
accepted from the beginning and there is still a 
certain resistance. The misunderstanding arising 
The speakers were confronted with the proposal 
that Brussels does not listen to the citizen 
concerns which underpin this debate. An audience 
member raised the fact that since 2004 there has 
been an imbalance between Eastern and Western 
countries which has created a greater incentive to 
move. This participant also questioned the nature 
of the debate itself, which seems to conflate many 
issues, and asked what happened to the letter from 
the four ministers. Speakers were questioned on 
how free movement in the EU compares with free 
movement in the USA. A participant sought 
clarification on the cited budget of 20% on 
integration, and asked what the remaining 80% is 
spent on. An audience member raised the 
elephant-in-the-room issue of the threat to social 
security systems posed by aging demographics 
and suggested considering the differences 
between social security systems in order to better 
understand the current mood of protectionism. 
 








from the term migrant was raised and it is true that 
even in the letter there was a conflation of EU 
citizens and Third Country nationals. The term 
‘migrant’ is used in the treaty so this is an issue of 
terminology but should be changed. 
Jackie Morin reiterated that the rate of mobility 
in the USA is 2.4%, compared to 0.2% in the EU 
and pointed out that the same administrative and 
language barriers are not present in the USA as in 
the EU. Language is one of the biggest obstacles 
to movement in Europe and acquisition of the host 
country’s language is a determining factor in 
successful migrant integration. 
Jackie Morin clarified that the ESF funds 
employment policies such as training for job 
seekers, labour market policies, etc., and the main 
bulk of its efforts are directed at this. 20% of the 
funds are dedicated to social inclusion and 
combating poverty and a portion of this is spent on 
the integration of workers. 
Is the limitation of free movement possible in the 
EU today? The benefits of free movement are 
macroeconomic and mobility results in a general 
rise in GDP. According to a recent survey by DG 
ENTERPRISE, 40% of employers say they have 
trouble finding staff with the appropriate skills, 
despite the high unemployment rate in Europe. In 
twenty years the active population will have 
decreased by 18 million due to an aging 
population. Today, in Austria and Germany there 
is an unemployment rate of 5% and a skills 
shortage in some sectors. So is limiting free 
movement an option, considering the huge 
disturbances that would result? Leaving aside the 
freedom aspect and considering only the economic 
side, it seems illogical to limit our economic 
capabilities in such a way. 
Yves Pascouau agreed that the debate comes 
down to people’s perceptions and citizens are 
blaming the EU for high unemployment even 
though this is a national competence, as are social 
systems. Irrationality, perceptions and insecurity 
in the face of globalisation is a major factor and 
many people are tempted to retreat to their 
national states. It is clear that the Swiss 
referendum a national issue, and politicians should 
refrain from extreme reactions to the outcome of a 
legal referendum. However, there have been 
extreme reactions from the anti-migration, anti-
EU parties in support of the result and yet no one 
has voiced an opposing view.  
Is there a big debate about immigration in the EU?  
Yves Pascouau stated that the answer is yes and 
no. This debate is divided between two issues: 
intra-EU mobility of EU citizens and migration. 
We must also keep in mind that the issue of 
freedom of movement of workers was previously 
under EPSCO competence and has now shifted to 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council which has a 
different approach to the issue. In terms of 
migration - the admission, stay and movement of 
Third Country nationals within the EU - we are 
mainly dealing with border management. Cecilia 
Malstöm’s attempts to push legal migration have 
been quashed in light of the financial crisis.  
On a terminological point, DG HOME uses the 
term ‘irregular migration’, despite the use of 
‘illegal migration’ in the Treaty; therefore, 
terminology does not necessarily have to match 
the Treaty text.  
Finally, whether or not the Commission is hearing 
and listening to what is said, Yves Pascouau is 
also struck by the fact that those working in EU 
affairs and the institutions are speaking a specific 
language that is not understood outside. There is a 








unique way of thinking and functioning which is 
to a certain extent, incompatible with citizens in 
the Member States.  
***
 
Yves Pascouau acknowledged that the Swiss 
referendum was about immigration from both EU 
and non-EU migrants, and highlighted that despite 
there being two other amendments put to vote in 
the referendum, all the focus was on the question 
on immigration. 
He also asked his co-speaker to clarify what he 
meant when he said that the EU-Swiss agreement 
could be renegotiated. Finally Yves Pascouau 
commented that before the crisis the idea of EU 
citizens falling into destitution in another state was 
unthinkable and yet that is the situation today. The 
results of this can be seen in citizens being sent 
back to their country because they are a ‘burden’. 
Jackie Morin began by answering some of the 
more specific questions addressed to him. Social 
security relates to risk factors: age, sickness, 
family, disability. Social assistance is not linked to 
a risk and relates to low income. There is a 
positive list of social security and whatever falls 
outside this is considered social assistance. For 
more information on what constitutes an 
unreasonable burden, the recent Brey Ruling 
should be consulted.  
As regards rights for job seekers; job seekers who 
want to search for a job in another Member State 
have the right to reside there for three months as is 
the general rules and have the right to stay another 
three months to make six months in total without 
an obligation to demonstrate sufficient resources. 
After this Member States can authorise a longer 
stay if there is a high probability of the citizen 
finding employment. If a job seeker was already 
claiming benefits in his or her home country, he or 
she can export these to the new country and 
continue to receive them. If the job seeker moves 
completely to the new country, then he or she falls 
under the rules of the new country. There is a 
proposal to update this in June 2014. 
On the question of support among young people, 
Jackie Morin does not have an age breakdown 
for the figure of 56% support for free movement. 
However, the figure of 20% of the EU population 
who were interested in moving to another state 
rises to over 50% among young people. The issue 
of skills is a very valid point. On the one hand 
there is competition for talent and high skills and 
on the other the problems of low skilled workers 
are highlighted and focused on. This is the idea 
A participant raised the issue of unequal 
distribution, stating that some groups have lost 
out, in terms of the jobs market and access to 
public services, as a result of free movement. 
Another issue raised is that of consent to EU 
policies and the issue of who decides these 
policies for the whole EU. It was pointed out that 
the Swiss referendum was about immigration in 
general, not just EU immigrants and it was 
suggested that the urban-rural divide is due to 
social dumping in cities where employers benefit 
greatly from lower wages for employees. Another 
member of the audience commented that EU-
mobile citizens need more support from local 
authorities and clearer explanations of the law. 
Clarification of the rules regarding mobile job 
seekers was sought from Mr Morin. A participant 
asked if the Commission had figures to indicate 
that low skilled workers don’t push out local 
workers or decrease wages and asked if there was 
data available regarding young citizens’ opinions 
on free movement. The issue of differences in 
perceptions of high skilled workers versus low 
skilled workers was raised. Mr Morin was asked 
to clarify the distinction between social assistance 
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behind limiting freedom of movement: to prevent 
poorer people and low skilled people from 
moving.  
Jackie Morin expressed agreement with the point 
about impact on the public service. This also 
relates to issue of social security benefits and cost. 
We need to reflect on how social security is 
organised. At the moment there is coordination 
and countries have total control of their own 
systems. The result is that individual states have to 
pay for their own citizens who move, or for 
citizens from other EU states. According to Jackie 
Morin, a ‘Europeanisation’ of the system - if 
unemployment benefit, for example, was 
organised on a European instead of national basis 
- it would change the nature of the debate on 
movement. He also clarified that, in accordance 
with the result of the referendum, Switzerland has 
three years to integrate it into its system which 
will probably involve a degree of adaption.  
*** 
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debates seek to address one of Europe’s most vital 
tasks: rekindling the citizen’s interest in EU matters. 
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the pan-European political debate by securing fair and 
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